Abstract: I review a series five primary results from experimental economics that impact on the economics profession as a whole. These results regard the relative (un)importance of subject sophistication in laboratory markets, the importance of gender on economic outcomes, the propensity for humans to behave in less than fully rational ways, the importance of trading institutions on economic performance and the behavioral relevance of economic theory. In overview, I find that economics as a profession has benefited from the use of experimental methods by fostering a dialogue between theorists and empiricists, better informing policy and improving data collection techniques.
Introduction.
My interest in experimental methods dates from the end of my time as a graduate school at Indiana University. For my doctoral thesis I chose to work on the topic of 'statistical discrimination' or motives other than prejudice that an employer might underestimate the ability of a minority job candidate (Davis, 1987) . My thought was that one possible reason for such misperceptions might be driven by a simple misuse of order statistics. Unlike a sample mean, which does not vary in expectation with the number of observations, the expected sample maximum is a function of the sample size. In contexts where employers focus on maximal rather than average quality, perhaps employers might incorrectly draw an inference about average quality from the sample maximum. Evaluating empirically such a hypothesis, particularly in light of the standard items in the toolkit of a budding economist in the early 1980's was a formidable challenge. One simply cannot usefully ask people whether or not their apparently discriminatory activities are motivated by racial animus.
Arlington Williams, a then new assistant professor at Indiana University (and a student of Vernon Smith), thought that my problem was both interesting and testable. Not, however, with naturally occurring data on hiring decisions, but in a streamlined laboratory setting, where student participants were asked to make evaluations not of job candidates, but rather through something more directly related to my theory, specifically by having financially motivated participants take random draws from two urns in a context where many more observations came from one urn than the other and where the participants were financially motivated to focus on the highest number drawn. If my theory was correct, then students would errantly view the less intensively sampled urn as containing lower numbers on average.
That approach worked. Although at the time radical, this innovative method of data collection not only allowed me to finish my thesis, but it opened for me the door to a relatively small group of extremely talented economists, who were remarkably willing to talk with an interested young scholar. I am profoundly grateful to these economists not only for their openness and encouragement in these initial years of my career but for their contagious sense of excitement that they were on the cusp of something really important. The basic rationale for the experimental method has remained pretty much the same over the years: using the lab can overcome the difficulties of finding data in many naturally occurring settings, the lab has a high degree of "internal validity" because it allows the researcher to change one variable at a time. All of these advantages have contributed to its acceptance as a standard tool in the economist's toolkit.
Along with acceptance of laboratory analysis as a legitimate research method, both techniques and research questions have changed. Within the lab, computerization has made both the implementation of experimental designs and the collection of data vastly easier. Outside the laboratory the development of field experiments has generated a remarkably useful complement to both laboratory methods and standard empirical methods. The use of field experiments outside the laboratory offers a remarkably useful complement to both laboratory methods and standard empirical methods as well.
1 Finally, an entirely new subfield of 'behavioral economics' has emerged.
Everyone appreciates that experimental methods now cast a large footprint on economics.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the how the outlines of that footprint impact on the economics profession as a whole. In particular, I focus on the potential value of this large, sometimes overwhelming volume of activity for non-experimentalists. Although I certainly cannot even pretend to be comprehensive in a short paper (and couldn't even, in the length of a sizable text) , 2 I here humbly offer the following five 'big lessons' that I have learned from thirty years of experimental analysis. I won't suggest that these are necessarily the five pinnacle 1 See e.g., Harrison and List (2004) for an introduction to and a review of field experiments. John List provided an overview of field experiments in his Distinguished Guest Lecture at the 84 th Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association in Atlanta Georgia. 2 Comprehensive, albeit somewhat dated treatments of experimental economics include Davis and Holt (1993) , and Kagel and Roth (1995) . See also Kagel and Roth (2016). contributions of laboratory methods to economics, but they certainly are lessons that first come to my mind as interesting and important.
Five Lessons from Laboratory Economics

2.1
College Sophomores Are Real People. One of the biggest sources of initial skepticism regarding the use of laboratory methods was that the typical subject pool consisted not of 'reals'
but of a convenience sample of university undergraduates. When testing economic theories, particularly propositions regarding interactions between firms or financial exchanges, the frequent use of college students has -appropriately -raised the criticism that 'reals' such as bankers or businessmen are far more sophisticated that the subject pool used to evaluate a theory.
The important news here is that in repeated comparison testing between college students and 'real' actors there is no important difference in behavior. In a recent paper Fréchette (2015a) evaluates thirteen studies conducted between 1964 and 2006 that contrast the behavior of college students with 'real' agents from a context pertinent to the theory being examined. A summary of his results appears as Figure 1 . In only one instance did the pertinent professional in any sense out-perform the college students 3 , 4 In another nine instances Fréchette reports no important differences across groups. 5 In another two instances the college students actually conformed more closely to the predictions of the theory than did the relevant professionals.
6
What explains this general absence of real versus undergraduate student subject pool effects? Most prominently, laboratory experiments are most frequently 'theory tests,' conducted in extremely streamlined contexts as close to the domain of the theory as possible. In such environments basic cognitive processes rather than occupation specific skills drive predictions and, as surprising as it may seem to many of those of us who regularly teach college 3 Namely, professional soccer players more nearly engaged in randomizing behavior in an asymmetric game with no pure strategy equilibrium. 4 The 13 studies Frechette (2015a) analyzes are only a subset of economics experiments that evaluate decisions made by actors with experience in a natural context pertinent to the market or decision context being investigated. Frechette confines attention to those studies that used both 'convenience sample' college undergraduates and 'reals' with pertinent experience. Other studies related have appeared more recently. A very nice current example is the recent study on the external validity of laboratory tax compliance experiments by Alm, Bloomquist and McKee (2015) . As with the majority of the studies assessed by Fréchette the decisions of college undergraduates did not differ significantly from the decisions of taxpayers. 5 These instances included contexts involving bidding in sealed bid auctions, common value actions, option pricing and gaming against managerial incentive schemes. 6 One such instance involved and oral auctions. The other involved free riding behavior in a voluntary contributions game.
undergraduates, there is no basis for thinking that the cognitive process of students differs from that of 'reals'. Further, the occupation specific skills of 'reals' may actually hinder performance in a laboratory context. That college students sometimes out-perform the relevant 'real' actors occurs because those with experience in a pertinent natural context may invoke their own mental scripts in an attempt to fill in the blanks of experimental instructions. For this reason they may attempt to extract information from features of the laboratory environment that, while useful in the natural context, are meaningless in the laboratory environment. This is not to say that the choice of subject pool is universally a matter of indifference. To the contrary, an entire branch of behavioral economics has developed in the last decade concerned with measuring individual characteristics such as risk posture, time discount rate, altruism, etc. These measures can differ substantially across populations of 'reals' including groups with different ages, races, cultures and sexes. 7 However, for the narrow purpose of testing theory, the use of a convenience sample rather than real agents does not importantly matter and people with pertinent expertise in a particular do not behave in a consistently different way.
The importance of individual characteristics on performance brings me to a second major lesson.
Gender Matters. I am an admittedly reluctant convert to the notion that gender
importantly affects behavior in relatively sterilized laboratory environments. While I am of course well aware of the bundle of differences in both biology and socialization that distinguish males and females, I was skeptical that these differences could meaningfully affect the way people played simple games. My conversion came fairly recently in a project regarding behavior in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games (Davis, Ivanov and Korenok, 2016) . It is well known that in such games subjects exhibit considerable heterogeneity in their propensities to cooperate and we were interested in identifying individual characteristics that affected cooperative propensities. So we did the following: We had individuals play a series of 'matches'
or indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. In each match participants were paired with a different, randomly selected, anonymous partner. Then, on a separate day, we had these same participants return to the lab and complete a battery of popular tests for eliciting individual characteristics, including risk postures, time discount rates, propensities for altruism, degrees of strategic sophistication and capacities to recognize of strategic dominance. Our intention was to see how these different characteristics correlated with individuals' propensities to either cooperate or engage in behaviors that promote cooperation, such as leadership, leniency or forgiveness. The surprising, at least to us, result was that with one notable exception, these individual characteristics had little impact on either cooperativeness or behavioral aspects might affect cooperative. The exception was gender. By a large margin, females cooperated significantly less frequently than males. Importantly what was surprising here was not that we observed an identifiable difference between women and men. A variety of gender-based differences, have been well documented, such as for example, the higher degree of risk aversion among females. 8 The surprise was the importance of the effect over a host of potential measures of individual characteristics.
Gender differences can have marked economic effects. Let me mention here two examples from laboratory experiments. The first regards 'glass ceiling' effects for women in the workplace (Niederlie and Vesterlund, 2008) . 9 These authors conducted a study where mixed groups of males and females were asked to make allocative decisions in a game in which earnings for all players would increase if exactly one player made a costly contribution to a group exchange prior to the expiration of a time limit. What they observed was that the males almost uniformly waited for females to make the contribution decision, and that females almost uniformly made it! The suggestion is that females (at least in mixed groups) feel compelled to make the costly decision for the group, a task that these two, very successful female economists considered analogous to volunteering to perform 'non-promotable' tasks in the workplace.
A second, equally provocative example studies gender effects in the context of asset markets Eckel and Fullbrűnn (2015) . A well-known area of behavioral research in financial economics regards the frequent (and almost pervasive) propensity for traders in a simple laboratory market to generate speculative pricing bubbles via the trade of assets with a commonly known payoff stream. Eckel and Fullbrűnn divided traders by gender into separate groups, endowed the traders in each market with identical combinations of assets and cash and then observed trading behavior in the declining value design standard in this line of research. Figure 2 illustrates the median prices for six female-only and six male-only groups. As can be seen female traders were much less likely to generate pricing bubbles than comparable groups of male traders. Eckel and
Fullbrűnn then tried mixed gender groups, and again found that mixed gender groups engaged in significantly less speculative behavior than did the male only cohorts.
I don't want to overstate the implications of these results. Recent work on gender effects in a very different asset market environment by Holt et al. (2015) suggest that it is preliminary to conclude that females may necessarily tame the wolves of Wall Street. 10 Nevertheless, while the 9 . Lise Vesterlund discussed glass ceiling effects in her 2014 Association Lecture to the 84 th Annual Meeting of the Southern Economics Association in Atlanta Georgia. 10 Numerous differences distinguish the designs used in Eckel and Fullbrűnn (2015) and Holt et al. (2015) . In addition to a declining asset balance, trades in Eckel and Fullbrűnn were conducted under double auction rules, traders were aware of the gender of other members of their cohort, and cash/asset endowments were heterogeneous across participants. In contrast in Holt et al. (2015) , trades were conducted under call market rules, traders had homogeneous endowments, and relative to Eckel and Fullbrűnn, traders were 'cash rich'. As in Eckel and Fullbrűnn, Holt et al. (2015) tested for risk aversion. Both studies report that females were relatively more risk averse.
interactions between genders and various features of laboratory designs remains unclear it is unquestionably the case that in some contexts gender prominently affects market outcomes. (2015) The presence and persistence of speculative trading bubbles suggests my third important lesson.
2.3
Humans Can Be Irrational. That we individually all make foolish decisions is, from a social perspective, relatively uninteresting. Perhaps a natural corollary to the old saw that 'a fool and his money are soon parted' is that 'most of us have less money than we might'. More interesting for us as economists are instances where people act in a predictably irrational way.
Laboratory methods have been powerfully instrumental in identifying such instances. 12 It wasn't so many years ago, for example, that the rational expectations hypothesis -the idea that asset prices conveyed the most accurate information available regarding the value of a firm, was regarded as an article of faith among financial economists. Work in behavioral finance, much of it stemming from the just mentioned research on speculative behavior in laboratory asset markets, initiated in Smith, Suchanck and Williams (1988) , has led to a much broader appreciation by economists that asset prices may persistently deviate from fundamental value.
13
11 My comments in the text regard only the effects of gender on decisions in a laboratory context. A related and fascinating area of investigation regards manipulations of hiring procedures that counteract gender bias in employment. For a recent example, see Bohnet, Van Geen and Bazerman (2015) , who show that making decisions collectively rather than individually tends to offset the effects of unconscious stereotypes in hiring decisions. 12 For a more general review of predictable irrationality, see Airely (2008) . 13 In this vein, observe that Robert Shiller, although not an experimental economist, received a share of the 2013 Nobel prize in economics for his work on behavioral finance. To further help sellers with their action choices they were also provided with a profit calculator that allowed them to identify the profit maximizing response to their forecasts. Experimentalists have identified a host of such predicable 'non-rational" regularities in the way people process and respond to information, ranging from the ameliorative effects of behavioral 'nudges' to factors affecting the human propensity to 'trust.' These developments, all fascinating in their own right, are more important collectively as they have led to the incorporation of psychology into economics. The emerging interdisciplinary field of behavioral economics contributes in fundamental ways to both economics and psychology, offering for psychologists an analytic foundation and forcing economists to consider seriously the essential elements of a parsimonious utility specification as well as the ways that human limitations, such as bounds on rationality, can be incorporated into economic models.
14 This comparison of decision rules in differentiated product Cournot and Bertrand environments motivates a fourth lesson.
Institutions Matter. Consider again the just-described differentiated product Cournot and
Bertrand market experiment. That sellers followed the same adjustment rules in relative terms does not imply that the two market structures converge on Nash predictions with equal speed or completeness. To the contrary, as can be seen in the mean transaction price paths for two representative markets shown in Figure 4 , performance varies markedly with the change in 14 See Camerer (2003) for an excellent overview of behavioral economics. strategic interactions. In stark contrast to the immediate collapse on Nash predictions in the Bertrand market, outcomes in the comparable Cournot market vacillate both persistently and wildly.
The difference in outcomes in the two market structures is driven by the very different gaps between forecasts and best responses that changing the basis of interactions induces. In the Bertrand market, where actions are strategic complements, optimization, herding and inertia are all very close together. In contrast, in the Cournot market, where actions are strategic substitutes, the best response to a forecast that deviates from the Nash prediction is a deviation of almost equal magnitude on the other side of the equilibrium. Thus, while the behavior of agents does not importantly vary across institutional structures, the way the institution interacts with these propensities can yield starkly different outcomes. Historically, the notion that institutions affect market performance was a primary motivation for the use of laboratory methods to investigate allocative questions in economics. In the late 1940's a residual uncertainty regarding the capacity of markets to allocate goods efficiently festered among some economists. This post-depression/post WWII skepticism, combined with an utter incapacity to observe directly either the supply or the demand curves necessary to evaluate competitive predictions motivated Edward Chamberlin's famous experiment evaluating the performance of a classroom market organized like the 'pit' on the Chicago mercantile exchange (Chamberlin, 1948 ). Chamberlin's experiment, which has become a staple exercise for introductory economics classes, yielded something less than fully efficient behavior. Smith , Right panel Davis and Holt (1997) .
Given the pervasiveness of retail type exchange in industrialized economics, the poor dynamic performance of posted offer markets has implications for the performance of economies a whole. For example, Davis and Korenok (2011) reports an experiment conducted to isolate the relative effects of 'sticky prices' and 'sticky information' in driving imperfect market responses to fully anticipated changes in price levels -an issue of longstanding concern among macroeconomics. In a monopolistically competitive market where sellers post prices each period, we found it was neither -rather the posted offer rules themselves induced an exceedingly slow adjustment to an inflationary increase in both prices and outputs.
The capacity of institutional alterations to fix market imperfections suggests that new 'hybrid' institutions can be constructed to allow efficient allocations in contexts where markets previously did not or could not exist. Examples include not only computer assisted markets where bidders demands for one property or asset is contingent on their ability to purchase a related property or asset, but also new market structures like government radio spectrum auctions, (e.g,. Plott and Salmon, 2004 ) markets for sodium dioxide emissions (e.g., Burtaw et al. 2010 ) and electricity distribution (e.g., Rassenti, Smith and Wilson, 2003) . have created a dialogue between experimentalists and theorists that allows for a refinement of theory in ways that make theory behaviorally relevant. A pertinent example comes from game theory. In the late 1990's a number of 'basic contradictions' had emerged as stylized facts, casting doubt on the capacity of game theory to organize human behavior in strategic situations.
Adapting the decision making process to include noise, Goeree and Holt (2001) shows that these behavioral inconsistencies could be both coherently explained and in fact predicted by allowing for a measure of noise in the decision making process.
My examples are certainly far from comprehensive. Useful interchanges between theorists and experimentalists have arisen in diverse areas including game theory, auctions, public goods, finance and labor economics, among others. My point is that traditional neoclassical economic theory provides a very useful basis for organizing economics outcomes, and that experimental methods are helping to both refine theory and make it more broadly useful. environment, it is difficult to imagine how it could plausibly organize data in a much more complex natural context. Importantly, even 'theory tests' can be policy relevant. Policies, after all, are based on theories, and the failure of a theory on (or very close to) its domain raises very justifiable concerns about the value of that theory as a basis for policy.
Also, laboratory experiments can be used to isolate in streamlined conditions regularities in human behavior that deviate from standard 'rational actor' assumptions. I discussed several pertinent examples of such experiments above, including those involving gender effects and collective irrationality. Here, I stress that laboratory results are, by themselves, only suggestive of behavior in natural contexts. Such experiments, however, can complement and allow exploration of parallel observations from less controlled studies in natural contexts. 15 In his introduction to a volume discussing the role of experimental methods in economics Roth (1987) offers what has become perhaps the most standard categorization of experiment types: 'Speaking to Theorists' or testing and refining theory, 'Searching for Facts' or attempting to evaluate individual preferences or the limitations of rationality and 'Whispering in the Ears of Princes,' or using experiments to evaluate policy alternatives. Of course, as Roth is careful to observe, many experimental investigations fail to fit neatly in one of these groups.
Experimental methods also can and have been used to improve data collection. Over twenty five years ago. Vernon Smith (at the time boldly) argued that economics differed from meteorology in that economists were not restricted to learn about the economy by watching events pass (Smith, 1994) . In addition to running experiments in the laboratory, however, Smith suggested that we could do a better job collecting data. The development and acceptance of experimental methods, particularly experiments done in the field, have helped considerably in this effort. The mindset of randomized trials, along with the variety of methods of eliciting individual characteristics has unquestionably improved our methods of collecting data in naturally occurring contexts. 16 Finally, consider what the use of laboratory methods will not be. Experimental methods will neither turn theory on its head, converting economic analysis into psychology nor replace more conventional empirical analysis. Rather, they provide an important complement to these existing methods, and in the process they will, I contribute to making economic analysis a more useful and predictive science.
